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Switzerland – From Splendid Isolation 
to Selected Cooperation
Tamara Ehs
Abstract: For a small, landlocked country with a difficult geography and no 
natural resources to speak of, Switzerland has done remarkably well. Nevertheless, 
the Alpine republic faced some difficulties during the 1990s, even a crisis: Since 
the fall of the Iron Curtain its role as a neutral go-between was questioned. And as 
European integration was moving forward the Swiss found themselves quite isolated. 
As a result, Switzerland cautiously took steps towards international integration 
and joined the United Nations in 2002. But the country still abstains from joining 
the EU, disliking the idea of laws made in Brussels rather than in Bern. Therefore 
Switzerland found a compromise with the EU by negotiating bilateral agreements, 
including on security issues. Although Switzerland still prefers to go it alone, the 
country is looking for a replacement for its diminished political weight by adopting 
a new role of selected cooperation: providing assistance in the Balkans within 
the framework of the PfP and ESDP, and joining the Schengen/Dublin-Agreement 
etc. As a small, neutral country Switzerland traditionally wants to offer itself 
as a go-between in today’s conflicts and tries to balance between keeping a low 
profile in its own foreign and security policy without losing even more ground and to 
provide space for “Good Offices”. Up to now, the country has been quite successful in 
doing so.
Key words: Cooperation, European Union, Good Offices, Identity, Neutrality, 
Security Policy, Switzerland
Introduction
“We want Switzerland to be a small, but active country which is part of the world. 
We do not want a Switzerland with an inferiority complex, nor one with delusions 
of grandeur; what we want is a Switzerland that is able to face itself in the mirror, 
a Switzerland that is not afraid of change, a Switzerland that tries to put its idea of 
itself into effect in the face of today’s problems and with today’s means.” (Burckhardt 
et al, 1955: 26)
Those words were spoken by Max Frisch, one of the leading thinkers on the Swiss 
nation and his compatriots, as the Cold War became constant reality and Switzerland 
began to find itself very comfortable in its isolated, neutral role as an intermediary 
between the blocs. Even 50 years ago Frisch could spot the core of Swiss identity that 
had (and has!) lasting influence on its policies, especially on its foreign and security 
policy: fluctuation between inferiority complex and thus fears of demise and feelings 
of superiority.
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Small states like Switzerland are often characterized by “a deficit in influence 
and autonomy” (Goetschel, 1999: 19). To minimize the consequences of this lack of 
power and therefore to protect their territorial integrity and political independence 
they often chose neutrality as a security option (Karsh, 1988). So did Switzerland. And 
this was the right choice for hundreds of years, when the Swiss definition of “nation” 
as a voluntary association of people having the same political beliefs was questioned 
by its neighbours France and especially Germany. Because, according to Johann 
Gottfried Herder, a nation is characterized by its common language and “without its 
own language, a Volk is an absurdity, a contradiction in terms” (Herder, 1995: 93). 
That is why Germany constantly claimed the German-speaking parts of Switzerland to 
be part of the German Empire, as did its powerful opponent for influence in Europe, 
France, concerning the French-speaking cantons. 
Regarded as being an “imperfect nation”, as Max Weber put it, absolute and perma-
nent neutrality therefore was the key to survival for Switzerland, situated in a region 
of belligerents in the age of nationalism. But times have changed: neither Germany 
nor France nor Italy challenge Swiss sovereignty any more. The European Union as 
a peace project is successful and there should be nothing to fear in Switzerland. But 
the Swiss are still loyal to neutrality, stay alliance-free and are not part of the European 
Union. 
“For a small, landlocked country of seven million people with a difficult geography 
and no natural resources to speak of, Switzerland has done remarkably well … (The 
country) stands for direct democracy, fairness, stability, quality, meticulousness, 
punctuality, thrift, efficiency openness and all sorts of other desirable things” wrote 
“The Economist” in 2004. Why then should the Swiss adopt a new international role?
Switzerland never was unstable or poor. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, Switzer-
land faced some difficulties during the 1990s, even of a crisis: Since the fall of the Iron 
Curtain Switzerland’s role as a neutral go-between was questioned. And as European 
integration was moving forward the Swiss found them quite isolated. Not that they had 
not enjoyed their splendid isolation before, but now they had to deal with the growing 
economic disadvantages and shortcomings in security because of not being part of the 
European Union or other alliances.
As a result, Switzerland slowly and cautiously took steps towards further 
international integration, and a small majority voted for joining the United Nations in 
2002. Switzerland is now prepared to back UN actions but the country still abstains 
from joining the European Union. It distrusts the EU’s centralising tendencies, and it 
dislikes the idea of laws made in Brussels rather than in Bern. Therefore Switzerland 
found compromise with the EU by negotiating a series of bilateral agreements also 
including security issues.
Although the Swiss still prefer to go it alone, the country is looking for a repla-
cement for its diminished political weight and adopting a new, modern role: Today, 
Switzerland is providing assistance in the Balkans within the framework of Partnership 
for Peace and ESDP, joining the Schengen/Dublin-Agreement and giving support for 
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the “Geneva Accord”, trying to find new ways of acting as an intermediary and to 
provide Good Offices to other countries. As a small, independent and neutral country 
Switzerland wants to offer itself as a trustworthy go-between for today’s conflicts and 
tries to do the splits between the two sides of its oscillating identity: keeping a low 
profile in its own foreign and security policy without losing even more ground and to 
provide space for peace talks and other initiatives. 
Up to now, the country is quite successful in doing so…
The Traditional Role: Intermediary & Good Offices
In taking a look at Swiss history and identity one can see how Switzerland has 
changed its attitude towards and role within the international community and it will 
even have to change in the years to come.
For more than a 100 years Switzerland was widely accepted as an intermediary 
because of its small size and – as supposed – limited political ambitions. No state or 
party to a conflict would have accused the Swiss of pursuing narrow political objecti-
ves, of engaging in power politics. Neutral Switzerland became the world’s leading 
mediator between countries not on speaking terms and held a range of mandates in 
arbitration matters. Switzerland’s policy became known as so-called “Good Offices” 
(Probst, 1989: 2). Those Good Offices trace back to the 19th century, when the first 
Swiss mediating role occurred in 1871 during the Franco-Prussian War. Although 
Switzerland’s Good Offices had declined in significance since the establishment of the 
permanent International Court of Justice in 1922, the country still had 19 Good Offices 
mandates in 1984, but 11 in 1991, and has only 4 today (Shepard, 2005: 1).
As we can see, demand for Swiss diplomacy’s Good Offices has fallen sharply 
since the end of the Cold War because the provision of Good Offices for conflict 
prevention and mediation has largely shifted to the United Nations. For this and 
many other reasons Switzerland is adopting a more active and cooperative, a more 
multilateral role.
But in doing so, first and foremost Switzerland has to deal with some key elements 
of its identity: the army and neutrality.
The Army, Neutrality, Identity and National Cohesion
Isolated territorial defence has become obsolete because Switzerland is surrounded 
by friends. Yet “the military remains a critical unifying sinew of the Swiss state” (van 
Heuven – Manning – Treverton, 1998: 6), and so does neutrality. Legally speaking, 
neutrality is only relevant to armed conflicts between states and not a basic obstacle to 
take part in European security policy. But huge parts of the Swiss population feel that 
any European security cooperation is against neutrality and therefore against “Swiss-
ness” itself. It is therefore not an exaggeration to say that Switzerland and neutrality 
are synonymous.
48 49
There is a peculiar linkage between Swiss identity and national security. “Switzer-
land is the only country in Europe where the idea of the nation-in-arms based on a ci-
tizen’s militia has survived until today” (Haltiner, 2002: 2). That is why John McPhee 
concluded somewhat ironically: “Switzerland does not have an army, Switzerland is 
an army!” (McPhee, 1984: 6). The army and especially neutrality became a symbol 
of national identification because neutrality fulfils a double function, as Karl W. 
Haltiner explored: “Externally, Switzerland is one of the few countries in Europe to 
have avoided wars over the last 150 years. This assured the Swiss of their opinion that 
the existence of their small Alpine republic is guaranteed only because neutrality has 
become the constant basis of Swiss foreign and security policy. Internally, the dangers 
of fragmentation have additionally strengthened neutrality. In a nation linguistically 
segmented and divided by confessional and cultural differences, neutrality served as 
an important agent of national cohesion.“ (Haltiner, 2002: 4).
In Switzerland, neutrality has survived mainly as a set of beliefs, not as a set of 
functions, with regard to foreign affairs. There is some kind of fictional sense of 
neutrality that corresponds with Swiss identity. Permanent neutrality, meaning no 
membership in any alliance and no foreign troops on the territory, is still closely linked 
to prosperity and peaceful safety in people’s minds.
But nowadays you do not have to be neutral to follow the peaceful path, even if 
you are small. In a changed and highly interdependent world peace has less and less 
to do with neutrality. The policy of “splendid isolation” seemed to guarantee security 
on a foreign basis as well as on a domestic level for many years. But with the end of 
the Cold War and intensified European integration some key values of Swiss foreign 
and security policy became obsolete. Neutrality is no longer the imperative it was for 
small nations during the 20th century. Given that the security environment is changing 
Switzerland will have to modify its attitudes and change its policy as well because 
neutrality is not sensible vis-à-vis terrorism or organized international crime.
A New Role: Security through Cooperation and a More Active Peace 
Facilitator
Switzerland’s neutrality during the Cold War seemed sensible, especially with 
regard to its traditional role of an international third party mediator. But today it finds 
itself in the midst of a new Europe. a Post-Cold War redefinition of Swiss security 
policy was required (Gabriel – Fischer, 2003). But when it comes to neutrality, the 
doctrine “Never change a winning horse” is still very popular with the people. The 
country is adapting to European trends of new security and defence structures, but 
slowly and cautiously.
There are some Swiss national interests that make it easier to leave behind the 
old role and look out for a new one. Firstly, Switzerland is directly affected by inter-
national crises because it is one of the preferred destinations of people seeking 
protection and asylum. The country has realized that international cooperation can 
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reduce flows of refugees. Secondly, with reference to is its small size, Switzerland 
cannot provide the overall infrastructure for international security operations and 
can therefore choose a role fitting its profile and interests (Ogi, 2000). And third, 
highly important for Switzerland, the economic interest: The stability that Swiss 
business needs to flourish worldwide requires peace. By supporting peace operations 
Switzerland supports Swiss business. And participating in international activities 
facilitates important contacts and relationships in business affairs. Moreover, future 
participation in the Schengen agreement is added value for Swiss tourism because 
tourists travelling to Europe will not require a second visa for Switzerland. Tourist 
experts predict a significant increase in revenue as a result.
There are still some leftovers from the good old days, and Switzerland is still trying 
to play its traditional role as mediator. For example, Switzerland is giving financial 
and logistical support for the “Geneva Accord”, an unofficial Israeli-Palestinian peace 
initiative brought into being in December 2003. But since the demand for Swiss Good 
Offices has fallen, a new more active “peace facilitator” role fills the gap together with 
the official strategy of “security through cooperation” presented in the Swiss “Security 
Policy Report 2000” (Sicherheitspolitischer Bericht, 2000). 
The new role fits and is already working, as recent examples show: On 14 April 
2005, the 12th contingent of “Swisscoy”, consisting of 211 KFOR soldiers was 
sent to Kosovo to act as a peace facilitator. On 30 April 2005, a Memorandum of 
Understanding between Austria and Switzerland concerning cooperation in airspace 
security was signed – as much an example for “Security through Cooperation” as 
the majority vote for joining the European Union’s Schengen/Dublin-Agreement on 
cooperation concerning justice and asylum on 5 June 2005. This marks an important 
step, a departure from the traditional status quo of a purely autonomous security and 
defence policy and is framed by the recent creation of three internationally oriented 
institutes working on security policy in Geneva: the Centre for Security Policy, the 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (Haltiner – Klein, 2002).
Much to our surprise we find that Switzerland is not excluding itself any more but 
cooperating on bilateral and multilateral levels. Switzerland has its reasons: The count-
ry undertook an in-depth review of its approach to security that resulted in a new threat 
analysis since the end of the Cold War, causing a development towards cooperative 
security. Revolutionary developments such as globalisation call for increased political 
coordination; the strategy of concentration on isolated territorial defence has become 
obsolete. That is why Switzerland is now implementing the guidelines of the Security 
Policy Report 2000 called “Security through Cooperation”. Retaining the militia prin-
ciple, Switzerland undertook army reforms with a clear Post-Cold War profile: Swiss 
forces have been successively reduced in size and professionalism has increased as 
have readiness and mobility. The objective was twofold: on the one hand, it is a matter 
of burden sharing to reduce the costs of an isolated security policy. As a consequence 
of the changed geopolitical situation the defence budget underwent significant step-
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-by-step cuts. On the other hand, the back door allows cooperation without alliance 
membership. The contribution to international peace support and crisis management 
and European security policies on a pick-and-choose-basis enables Switzerland to 
minimize the negative aspects of neutrality and standing outside the European Union 
and other alliances by minding the importance of neutrality for Swiss identity at the 
same time. Furthermore, neutrality should not be confused with indifference towards 
the outside world.
Although Switzerland has participated in international peace-support operations 
since the 1960s a strict interpretation of neutrality confined its tasks in joint security 
ventures. Not until the 1990s, when Switzerland had to realize that isolation and abso-
lute neutrality were not so promising anymore, the country slowly changed its foreign 
and security policy by diffidently opening to the world. That is why Switzerland joined 
the Partnership for Peace following Swiss Chairmanship of the OSCE in 1996 and has 
been a member of the United Nations since 2002, which was hailed as a major step 
forward into the concert of nations and a commitment to its long-standing humanita-
rian tradition. Swiss military observers are active on a number of UN missions, from 
Georgia through former Yugoslavia to the Middle East and Congo. Switzerland has 
also been an associate member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO-PA) 
since May 1999 and provides a logistics and support unit as well as mechanized 
infantry of about 220 men and women to the Austrian “KFOR” contingent (Kosovo 
Force) called “Swisscoy” (Swiss Company), based in Camp Casablanca, Suva Reka, 
since September 1999. 
Moreover, Switzerland is also cooperating at the level of the European Union.
Approaching Europe
After Swiss voters narrowly turned down the government’s membership bid to the 
European Economic Area (EEA) in 1992 because the union is perceived as falling 
short in democratic institutions that play a crucial role in Swiss self-conception, 
Switzerland chose the bilateral path by negotiating on specific interests and problems. 
The first set of bilateral treaties, mainly on trade, labour and transport issues, came into 
force in 2002. The second series, signed in October 2004, includes issues that affect 
Switzerland’s new international role more than any other previous agreement: on 
5 June 2005, a popular vote was held on Switzerland’s participation in the Schengen/
Dublin association agreements, two areas of great importance for Switzerland, namely 
cooperation in the fields of police and justice, asylum and migration.
In effect, after the approval of the association agreement by a small majority of 
54.6 per cent, Switzerland will cede much control of its borders to the European 
Union. The Alpine republic finds it harder and harder to remain an island 
because terrorism and modern forms of international crime know no borders. The 
threats of the 21st century require better international information and warning networks 
(i.e. the Schengen Information System (SIS), the fingerprint database EURODAC) and 
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coordination with other states on asylum (van Heuven – Manning – Treverton, 1998: 6). 
Even cooperation between individual partner states is not sufficient to combat modern 
forms of crime, and broader networks are therefore required. This conflicts fundamentally 
with Switzerland’s identity as an international maverick and demands rethinking.
If the Schengen/Dublin would have been rejected it would have been Switzerland 
that would have suffered as a result because it would have become more attractive as 
a destination for asylum seekers who have been expelled from the European Union 
(Haltiner, 2002: 7). Like both other associated states, Norway and Iceland, participa-
tion in Schengen/Dublin will give Switzerland no formal joint decision-making rights 
but a formal right of decision-shaping, i.e. Swiss experts will be able to participate in 
all relevant EU working groups.
Furthermore, the European Union is now (since the establishment of ESDP –
European Security and Defence Policy in 1999) capable of carrying out a wide variety 
of peace missions both of a civilian and a military nature. In 2003 the EU started 
to put ESDP into practice and has developed tools for crisis management in Bosnia 
and Macedonia. Since these early beginnings, Switzerland has placed civilian police 
officers at the disposal of the EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (called 
“EUPM”) and in Macedonia (called “Proxima”). In order for Switzerland to take part 
in military peace-promotion activities, a UN or OSCE mandate is required because 
Swiss troops may not participate in military actions whose purpose is to impose 
peace. But participation in ESDP peace-facilitating missions means that Switzerland 
is implementing the guidelines of the Security Policy Report 2000 “Security through 
Cooperation” with the European Union as a partner.
Maybe this is an indication that even Switzerland is on a “European path”. as Bi-
deleux noticed already ten years ago for other neutral states: “(T)he declining strength 
of Austrian, Finnish and even Swedish neutrality after the collapse of the Soviet bloc 
and the end of the Cold War … played a major role in persuading them to join the EU 
for fear of being left “out in the cold’” (Bideleux, 1996: 292).
Conclusion
In addition to the above-quoted Max Frisch said: “We want Switzerland to be 
a country that, although small, is alive and part of the world, not just a museum, 
a European spa, a retirement sanctuary, a passport bureaucracy, a vault, a crossroad 
of merchants and spies, or an idyll.” (Burckhardt – Frisch – Kutter, 1955: 29). It seems 
that 50 years later his wishes may come true. To put it somewhat cynically, Switzerland 
is still too well off to join the European Union and to become a full member of this part 
of the world. But the country is approaching Europe and the international community 
step-by-step after having realized that entire isolation is not so splendid anymore. 
Today, the Swiss are experiencing a gradual disenchantment with neutrality and the 
army as a stronghold of national identification. They have to look out for a new role to 
cope with this development.
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Switzerland’s new role in the world and especially in Europe today knows two 
ways: 1) Security through Cooperation as laid down in the Security Policy Report 
2000, 2) supplemented by the Peace Facilitator role. The Confederacy finally joined 
the United Nations in 2002 and has already signed two Bilateral Agreements with the 
European Union. The first set of bilateral agreements on trade and labour issues came 
into force in 2002. a second set of nine treaties on security issues was signed last year. 
The most recent step was the approval of the Schengen/Dublin association agreement 
on 5 June 2005. In September 2005, there will be a vote on extending an accord on the 
free movement of people to the ten new member states – bringing Switzerland closer 
to the European Union little by little without renewing its membership bid that is still 
opposed by the majority (Swissinfo: 20.06.2005).
Moreover, Switzerland joined the Partnership for Peace in 1996, is an associated 
member to NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO-PA) since 1999, provides the 
“Swisscoy”-contingent for KFOR since 1999 as well, and participates in ESDP 
missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Macedonia since 2003. Additionally, 
providing Good Offices and a policy called “constructive exertion of influence”, 
as recently outlined by foreign minister Micheline Calmy-Rey (NZZ: 22.05.2005), 
remain a Swiss foreign policy goal although Switzerland is no longer the automatic 
choice as go-between in conflicts as it was during the Cold War. 
Despite the warily approval of a more active foreign and security policy by the 
Swiss public, surveys still reveal strong reservations concerning a more aggressive 
opening up of the country (Bennett et al, 2002). Switzerland surely is adapting to 
the changed world order and to European trends of security and defence structures, 
but slowly and cautiously because it’s peculiar linkage between national identity and 
national security is an obstacle for changing roles more quickly.
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